With the rapid development of edge computing technology, the scale of the network continues to expand. Various types of applications are becoming more widespread. In the edge computing, existing network agents, NAT, IP tunneling technologies, and rapidly evolving anonymous communication systems provide convenience for attackers to hide real IP. In addition, the attacker forms a ''stepping'' chain by breaking through several intermediate systems of the edge computing network. Thereby implementing an invisible intrusion attack across multiple autonomous domains can increase the difficulty of intrusion tracking. Aiming at the problem of insufficient applicability of existing interval centroid based watermarking technique, this paper proposes a histogram specified interval centroid-based watermarking technique. It improves crossdomain collaborative intrusion tracking. This technique improves the resistance of the prior art to multiflow attacks in edge computing. It decreases the time and space overhead of the detector. Compared with other interval centroid based watermarking techniques, this method has stronger concealment. The proposed method can effectively defend against multi-flow attacks of edge computing. The time and space overhead of the detector can be reduced when multiple attack flows are tracked in parallel. Thus, it is suitable for edge computing. The robustness and adaptability are improved by this method.
existence of the network flow between the sender and the receiver. Thus, intrusion tracking can be implemented.
The network flow watermarking technology implements network flow association by modulating a specific watermark in the network flow of the sender. Then, the communication relationship between the sender and the receiver can be verified [2] . The network flow watermarking model mainly includes original network flow, watermark, watermark carrier, embedded function, extracting function and comparison function. Figure 1 shows the basic framework for implementing intrusion tracking using network flow watermarking. The intrusion tracking process of a network flow watermark is as follows:
The watermarking embedder closest to the attacker is responsible for the original watermark generation, watermark Centroid-based Watermarking (HSICBW) method is proposed [6] , [7] . It uses the group mapping rule to implement the histogram specification for the packet time in the interval. The proposed method increases the interval centroid and complete the invisible embedding of the watermark. Compared with other interval centroid based watermarking schemes, this method reduce the time delay for data packets in intervals. It does not generate an empty period that no data packets reach. Thus, it enhances the privacy of the interval centroid based watermarking schemeand defends against multi-flow attacks [8] . In addition, the data packet time in the interval basically conforms to the uniform distribution. HSICBW pre-calculates the predetermined mapping function according to the interval length and the modulation amplitude. Then the real-time specification operation of the data packet time in the network flow is realized [9] , [10] . It avoids the extra time and space overhead caused by the repeated calculation of the mapping function with strong enforceability [10] , [11] .
This paper is arranged as follows: In section II, the cuttingedge network flow watermarking methods are introduced. For the problem that the interval centroid based watermarking scheme is vulnerable to the multi-flow attacks of edge computing, the paper first analyzes the invisibility of the current mainstream interval centroid based watermarking schemes. Then combined with the principle and implementation flow of edge computing multi-flow attacks, a histogram specified interval centroid-based watermarking method is proposed. Next, the principle and implementation flow of the HSICBW method are introduced. Then a multiple flows parallel tracking scheme based on HSICBW is given. Finally, experiments were carried out to verify the tracking accuracy of HSICBW and the ability to resist edge computing multi-flow attacks. The research framework is shown in FIGURE 2.
II. RELATED WORKS
In recent years, many scholars have proposed a variety of network flow watermarking methods. These work applied network flow watermarking to ''stepping'' detection [12] , anonymous communication system tracking [13] , [14] , cloud tracking [15] , [16] and other fields. This paper investigates the current network flow watermarking technology and classifies it according to the carrier carrying the watermark signal as follows:
(1) Flow watermarking technology based on packet payload
The packet payload refers to the data carried by the data packet. It is divided into a payload for storing the information data and a management for storing other identification information. The packet-based flow watermarking technology completes the intrusion tracking by artificially modifying the payload of the data packet in the network flow. Then it completes the embedding of the watermark signal and detects the watermark signal in the packet payload. Wang et al. [17] proposed Sleepy WaterMark Tracing (SWTin 2001. The SWT framework separates intrusion detection from intrusion tracking. When no intrusion is found in the system, the tracking system is in a dormant state and does not consume any resources. Once there is an intrusion, SWT will start the tracking system. Then it will fill the watermark signal to the packet payload returned by the target host to the intruder. The router in the network is to detect the watermark signal to complete the tracking of the intrusion source. This method does not need to record all packets entering and leaving the system. It consumes less resources. However, SWT takes the payload content of the packet as the carrier. Thus it is limited to a specific communication protocol and cannot be used for encrypted traffic tracking. It can be easily discovered and filtered by an attacker. To detect zombie hosts, Rambrock et al. [18] proposed a method of embedding characters in an application layer message to embed a watermark signal. This solution changes the length of the packet rather than the payload content. It can be effectively deployed in scenarios where SSL, TLS encryption, multiple intermediate nodes, or network traffic is mixed.
(2) Flow rate based watermarking technology The flow rate refers to the transmission rate of the network stream in a certain period of time. The stream rate based watermarking technique embeds the watermark signal by adjusting the stream rate for different time periods during the duration of the network stream. Fu et al. [19] used frequency domain analysis technology to transform the time domain watermark into a frequency with constant characteristics. Then they embed the watermark signal into the network stream by electromagnetic interference to realize the intrusion tracking in the wireless network. In 2007, Yu et al. [20] applied Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) in CDMA wireless communication system to the network flow watermarking. They completed the watermark signal embedding by adjusting the rate of the network stream at the transmitting end. The method can accommodate a large amounts of watermark.The model can achieve parallel tracking of multiple attack streams. A high tracking rate in a stable flow rate environment can be achieved. The disadvantage is that it is vulnerable to the mean-square autocorrelation attack and cannot be applied to network environments with large fluctuations in flow rate. Huang et al. [21] improved the scheme of Fu in 2011. This scheme can resist the Mean-Square autocorrelation attack very well. Because it is difficult to produce a long PN code that meets the conditions Its implementation is slightly poor.
(
3) Flow watermarking technology based on inter-packet delay
Inter-packet delay (IPD) refers to the time difference between a pair of data packets arriving at the host in the same network stream. The stream watermarking technique based on the inter-packet delay embeds the watermark signal by delaying the IP D between the data packets by delaying the specified data packets in the network stream. Such a scheme has the advantages of large watermark signal capacity, low watermark embedding and extraction time and space overhead. The disadvantage is that it is difficult to deal with common intra-stream transform problems such as dummy packet, packet loss, and packet reassembly. Wang and Reeves [12] proposed an IPD-based watermarking scheme in 2003. The method selects several data packets in the network stream randomly. It embeds the watermark signal by fine-tuning the IPD of the data packet. This scheme has the advantages of simple implementation and high accuracy. In 2005, Wang et al. [22] proposed a stream watermarking method based on packet-to-packet delay when tracking anonymous VoIP calls. This method forms a number of IPD pairs in a certain increment of data packets in the network stream and divides them into two randomly. In these two groups, the watermark signal embedding work is completed by delaying the corresponding IP packet in the IPD group to change the average IPD value. Similar to this method, Pan et al. [23] proposed a packet-based packet-based watermarking technique in 2009. It can significantly alleviate watermark detection rate degradation caused by time disturbance. Park and Reeves [24] proposed an adaptive network flow watermarking technique in 2007. This scheme adaptively selects watermark parameters according to the actual situation of the watermark network stream. The parameters to be embedded is to complete the watermark embedding work. In order to reduce the impact of adding dummy packets to the network stream, Peng et al. [25] used the packet matching technique in the watermarking scheme. This scheme matches the appropriate data packets in the network stream and then performs data stream association. The method can reduce the impact of dummy packets on watermark detection.
Houmansadr et al. [6] and Houmansadr and Borisov [26] proposed a non-blind detection watermarking technology RAINBOW. RAINBOW stores the original IPD of the network stream in the database at the watermark embedding end. It fine-tunes the IPD of the network stream and receives it at the watermark detection end. The obtained network stream IPD matches the original IPD information in the database to complete the watermark detection. Since the technology depends on the database a lot, the IPD matching work on the watermark extracting end also consumes a large amount of resources. So the implementation is poor. In 2012, Gong et al. [27] improved the Houmansadr scheme and proposed a hidden Markov-based invisible watermarking technique. This scheme uses the quantization index to determine the location of the watermark embedding. It realizes the invisible embedding of the watermark signal. At the same time, the maximum likelihood decoding method based on hidden Markov is proposed to improve the accuracy and efficiency of watermark detection.
(4) Time-based stream watermarking technology In order to solve the impact of packet reassembly on the watermarking technology based on inter-packet delay, Pyun et al. [28] proposed Interval-Based WaterMarking (IBW) in 2007. The IBW cuts the network stream from a certain initial offset into a number of equal length periods, called slots. In this scheme, the time slots in the network stream are used as invariants on both sides of the ''springboard'' machine. The the data packets in the time slot are delayed to control the number of data packets in the time slot. The watermark signal is embedded. The experimentsl show that this method can effectively deal with the problem of packet reorganization and time disturbance. In 2012, Pyun et al. [29] improved the IBW scheme by actively modulating the data packet to a specific time slot and embedding a watermark with self-synchronization properties. Thus it can effectively deal with dummy packet, stream segmentation and stream merging.
(5) Flow-based watermarking technology based on slot centroid
The average of the offset of each packet arrival time in the slot relative to the slot start time is represented as the slot centroid. The slot centroid represents the equilibrium point in the slot. Wang et al. [13] demonstrated that when there are enough data packets in a time slot, the packet time in the time slot is basically uniform. Its centroid is stable at T/2. The watermarking technology with the slot centroid as the watermark carrier can effectively deal with the intra-flow transform problem such as dummy packet, packet loss, packet reassembly, etc. This method is more robust. Wang et al. [13] proposed a time slot centroid-based watermarking scheme (ICBW) in 2007. The ICBW divides the network stream into several equal-length time slots by using the time length T and the starting offset o. It is well resistant to time interference. In order to enhance the detection rate of ICBW, Wang et al. [30] proposed a dual-slot centroid-based watermarking scheme (DICBW) in 2010. Unlike ICBW, DIBC is embedded in a group of A and B selected by a watermark signal. The time slots are physically adjacent. When the watermark signal 1 is embedded, the packet time of the corresponding time slot in the two groups A and B is simultaneously compressed. Compared to ICBW, DIBCW has a higher detection rate. In order to better defend against MFA attacks, Luo et al. [31] combined ICBW and DSSS technology in 2012 to propose a slot-based centroid-based spreadspectrum watermarking scheme (ICBSSW). The scheme selects different pseudo noise codes and random functions S as parameters for different network flows, which can effectively resist MFA attacks .It is suitable for parallel tracking of multiple attack streams. The disadvantage of ICBSSW is that the watermark detection requires repeated trials of parameters, and thus the space-time overhead is large.
Based on the analysis of current network intrusion status and existing intrusion tracking technology, it can be found that IP packet tracking technology cannot track intruders hidden behind ''stepping'' machines or anonymous communication systems. It relies on router devices in the network. The passive traffic analysis technology of the network has the disadvantages of long observation time, low matching rate and high resource consumption when used for network flow association. The active traffic analysis technology represented by network flow watermarking technology has high tracking efficiency and low false positive rate. The advantages is that it costs short observation time. However when the network flow is modulated, there will be obvious features, which are easy to be discovered, suppressed or even removed by attackers. In addition, there is still a lack of efficient and secure cross-domain collaboration intrusion tracking framework to achieve intrusion tracking linkage between autonomous domains.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE INVISIBILITY OF COMMON INTERVAL CENTROID BASED WATERMARKING SCHEME
This paper analyzes the invisibility of the commonly used interval centroid based watermarking schemes: Interval Centroid Based Watermarking (ICBW) proposed by Wang et al. [13] , Double Interval Centroid-Based Watermarking Scheme (DICBW) proposed by Wang et al. [30] , Gao et al. [32] , and Gao et al. [33] and the interval centroid based watermarking (ICBFW) scheme proposed by Zhang and Luo [14] and Gao et al. [34] . This section analyzes the watermark implementation principle and watermark embedding method of these schemes.
Wang et al. [13] first proposed the ICBW watermarking scheme [35] . The implementation process is as follows. First, according to the preset parameters, buffering 2n intervals with interval length T starting at the beginning of the network flow O>0. Then dividing them into two large groups A and B equally according to random selection function S. r intervals are randomly selected from the two groups A and B. A watermark is embedded which value is the difference of the combined interval centroid. If the embedded watermark is 1, the compression operation is performed on the corresponding interval group with quotation (1). The centroid is then increased. If the embedded watermark is −1, the same operation is performed for the corresponding interval group in the group use (1) .
The schematic diagram of the process of ICBW embedding a watermark is shown in Figure 3 . When the packet time in the interval is compressed, its distribution is transformed from a uniform distribution over the interval [0, T ] , to a uniform distribution over the interval [α, T ]. For any interval that has been compressed, there will be an empty period of no packets of length α from the start of the interval to α .
Wang et al. [30] proposed DIBCW, which starts at the beginning of the network flow o >0, with the interval length T, buffers 2n intervals. DIBCW divides them into two groups of same number, A and B. When embedding a watermark, intervals in the A and B groups selected according to DICBW scheme must be physically adjacent. Then calculating the combined centroids A i and B i which corresponding to a watermark in the groups A and B by (2) and (3). Next to calculate (4) to get the combined interval centroid difference value Y i . N A i and N B i represent the total number of data packets embedded in w i in the A and B groups respectively. t i,j,k indicates the offset value of the k-th data packet in the interval I i,j relative to the start of the interval.
When the embedded watermark is 1, the intervals corresponding to the watermarks of the A and B groups are compressed use (5) . Here, A i is increased and B i is decreased. Thereby the combined interval centroid difference value Y i is increased. When the embedded watermark is −1, part of the data packets in the A group are delayed into the intervals of the B group use (6) to decrease the aggregate centroid of A. At the same time, the data packets in the B group whose time offset is less than α are delayed to increase the interval aggregation centroid of the B group with (7) . Thenthe combined interval centroid difference value Y i is decreased.
(7) Figure 4 shows the watermark embedding of DIBCW [36] . When the embedded watermark is 1, the data packet time in A and B is compressed at the same time. Its distribution is transformed from a uniform distribution over the interval [0, T ] , to a uniform distribution over the interval [α, T ]. There will be an empty period from the start of the interval to α. When the embedded watermark is −1, part of data in A is delayed to B, and its distribution is transformed from the uniform distribution over the interval [0, T ] , to the uniform distribution over the interval [0, T − α]. There is an empty period from T − α to T.
Both ICBW and DIBCW embed watermarks use the combined interval centroid difference value in the A and B groups [37] , [38] . The ICBFW watermarking scheme proposed by Zhang et al. uses only one set of intervals to embed the watermark [14] , [39] . When compressing the interval, a relatively large delay is added in advance. The centroid of the interval is increased or decreased on the basis of this. Then the embedding of the watermark can be completed. When the watermark is 1, the centroid of the corresponding interval group is increased use (8) . t i is the offset of the i-th packet relative to the start of the interval. t i is the relative offset after being adjusted. α is the modulation amplitude and b is the pre-added delay in the interval group. When the embedded watermark is −1, its interval centroid is decreased by (9) .
The embedded watermark is shown in Figure 5 . After increasing the centroid of the interval, the distribution of the packet time in the interval is transformed from a uniform distribution over the interval [0, T ] , to a uniform distribution over the interval [α, T ]. From the start of the interval to α, there will be an empty period of no data packet whose length is α. After decreasing the centroid of the interval, the distribution of the packet time in the interval is converted from a uniform distribution over the interval [0, T ] , to a uniform distribution over the interval [0, T − α]. There is an empty period from T − α to T .
Based on the aboe analysis, the interval centroid based watermarking scheme will generate an empty period without data packets after compressing the intervals [40] . Moreover, the length of the empty period increases as the modulation amplitude increases. This empty period will be exploited by attackers. Then edge computing multi-flow attacks will be launched. Although it is possible to defend against edge computing multi-flow attacks by adopting different random selection strategys or using different PN code spreading for different network flows. When the detector recovers the watermark, it needs to try the parameters repeatedly. This will bring additional time and space overhead to the watermark matching.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION PRINCIPLES AND DEFENSE METHOD OF MULTI-FLOW ATTACKS IN EDGE COMPUTING A. IMPEMENTATION PRINCIPLES OF EDGE COMPUTING MULTI-FLOW ATTACKS
The interval watermarking scheme represented by DSSS, ICBW and IBW will produce a more obvious time dependence when embedding the watermark. The specific performance is as follows. According to the implementation principle of the DSSS watermarking scheme, the embedder embeds the watermark by changing the flow rate of the network flow. When the embedded watermark is 1, the network flow is transmitted. When the watermark is −1, the transmission of the network flow is suspended. This will result in empty period with the length of one symbol as a unit in the target network flow. In the ICBW scheme, the interval centroid is increased or decreased by compressing the packet time of the interval. This will result in an empty period of length modulation amplitude at the beginning or end of the interval. In the IBW scheme, once a watermark is embedded, part of the data packet of one interval is delayed into the next interval. This often results in an empty period which lasts for the length of the interval. The attacker will use these periods to detect whether there is a watermark in the network flow. Then the attacker can obtain the watermark invisible parameters and remove the watermark.
Kiyavash et al. modeled interactive network communication by establishing a Markov-modulated Poisson Process (MMPP) model and gave an equation for calculating the probability of no packet arrival within a specified length of time [3] , [41] . When the length is long enough, the probability of no packets arriving in the period is small, so the watermark can be detected by observing the empty period in the network flow. For multiple network flows embedded with the same watermark, the empty period in the network flow can be amplified by the alignment operation. This method of detects the watermark by aligning multiple network flows. It is named edge computing multi-flow attacks (MFA). The MFA can be used to detect the watermark carried in the network flow, even recover the invisible parameters of the watermark, and remove the watermark from the label flow. For the network flow embedded with different watermark information, it is also possible to find enough network flows carrying the same watermark in a limited search space and launch the MFA according to the pigeon nest principle.
The principle of MFA is as follows: For a interval of length T, it is assumed that the time of the packet arriving in the interval is: t 1 < t 2 < . . . <t n , where t i represents the time when the i-th packet arrives. The packet time group t m = (t 1 , t 2 , . . . ,t n ) is used to represent the network flow f m . Kiyavash et al. [3] modeled the network flow f m using the Markov-modulated Poisson Process Model (MMPP) with a state set {0, 1}, where 0 represents the arrival of a packet and 1 represents silent state with no packet. As Figure 6 shows, X(t) is used to indicate the state of the network flow when the timestamp is t. It is assumed that the distribution at state 0 obeys the Poisson distribution of the parameter λ 0 . The probability distribution function of its distribution is as follows: f θ (t) = λe −λ 0 t . When the state is 1, the Poisson distribution obeying the parameter λ 1 , usually λ 1 < λ 0 . When the network is in a silent state, its state is 1. Once a packet arrives, the state of the Markov chain becomes zero. Set the Markov state transition equation to {P i,j , i, j = 0, 1}, as in (10): P 00 + P 01 = 1,P 10 = 1,P 11 = 0
The Markov chain can be defined as the matrix: P 00 1 1 − P 00 0 . The steady-state probabilities π 0 , π 1 of the chain are given by (11):
The steady state probability P 0 , P 1 are given by (12):
According to the state transition equation, assuming that the current flow f m state is i. The probability that the state becomes 0 within the time l is:
That is, for flow f m modeled by MMPP, the probability that there is no packet arriving in a period of length l is P f m (0; l), where:
When the appropriate observation time l is set to make P f m (0; l) large enough, there is no packet arrive in the period. That is, there is no watermark.
In ICBW and IBW watermarking schemes, Kiyavash et al. observed k network flows at the same time to determine whether there is a watermark. Setf k to represent the aggregation of the k network flows. Since the packet time distribution of different flows is independent of each other, the probability that no data message arrives within time l is:
Kiyavash gives the parameters of P 00 , λ 0 , λ 1 according to the statistics of network communication :
In the ICBW watermarking scheme, assuming a modulation amplitude of 350 ms. According to the MMPP model, in a normal network flow (with no watermark applied), the probability of no data message arriving in the period is P f m (0; 0.35) = 0.33. If k = 10 data flows are observed simultaneously, the probability that no data message arrives within 350 ms is as low as P f m (0; 0.35) 10 = 1.6×10 −5 . Suppose the selected k flows are different in embedding watermarks. According to the pigeonhole principle, 2k − 1 network flows can still be selected. In this way, at least k data flows are embedded with the same watermark.
The complexity of finding these k network flows is 2k − 1 k . When k = 10, the search complexity is 19 10 = 92378. The multi-flow attacks can still be implemented.
B. DEFENSIVE METHODS OF EDGE COMPUTING MULTI-FLOW ATTACKS
Increasing the complexity of MFA searching multiple network flows embedded with the same watermark is an effective method for edge computing multi-flow attacks resistance. Kiyavash proposes two ideas for defending against multiflow attacks. One idea is Multiple Offsets, which embeds watermarks on different network flows by selecting different starting offsets. The other is Multiple Postions, which embeds watermarks into different network flows by selecting different locations. For the first solution, the search complexity of selecting a k-aligned network flows from the n network flows is n k−1 , which brings difficulties to the attacker. For the interval centroid based watermark scheme and the interval watermark scheme, Multiple Postions can be implemented by selecting different random distribution functions S for different network flows. For the DSSS watermarking scheme, Multiple Postions can be implemented by selecting different PN codes to spread different network flows. For the attacker, assume that the number of random distribution functions is n. If the probability of finding the k strip from multiple network flows using the same random distribution function S is (1/n) k−1 , according to the pigeon's nest principle, it takes n (k − 1) + 1 k to find the k network flows. As n increases, the complexity will increase exponentially. This will bring great difficulties to attackers. The current mainstream methods for preventing edge computing multi-flow attacks are based on Multiple Postions [3] , [42] , or the combination of Multiple Postions and Multiple Offsets [31] , [43] . Selecting different offsets or different locations to embed watermarks on multiple network flows can enhance the resistance to MFA. However, these parameters need to be repeatedly tried when detecting watermarks. The time complexity increases linearly with the number of offsets and the number of random selection functions.
V. PRINCIPLES AND IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS OF HISTOGRAM SPECIFIED INTERVAL CENTROID-BASED WATERMARKING
Through the analysis of the principle and implementation steps of the multi-flow attacks, this paper finds that the MFA uses the empty period in the observed network flows. There is no packet arrives in for a long time to carry out the attack. In this chapter, we analyze the ICBW, DIIBW, and ICBFW. These three interval centroid based watermarking schemes compress the data packets in the interval through linear transformation. This linear transformation principle is simple and easy to implement and analyze. However, it results in a long time empty period in the interval. The interval is easily exploited by an attacker. Therefore, the paper looks for an effective nonlinear transformation to compress the interval. While ensuring the increase of the interval centroid, the length of the empty period existing in the interval is decreased. Thus, the privacy of the interval centroid based watermarking scheme can be enhanced. Thereby effectively defending against multi-flow attacks.
In grayscale image processing, some grayscale intervals of the original image are enhanced. The shape of the artificial histogram is artificially corrected to match the desired histogram. This transformation is called histogram specification. The image normalized by the histogram has the same number of pixels. The gray scale remains between [0, 255]. In this paper, the histogram specification is applied to the interval centroid based watermarking scheme. The purpose of adjusting the interval centroid is achieved by specifying the histogram of the interval. Compared with ICBW, DIBCW and ICBFW, under the same modulation amplitude, the length of the interval can be significantly decreased. The privacy of the watermark is enhanced.
A. PRINCIPLES AND COMMON METHODS OF HISTOGRAM NORMALIZATION
In image processing, sometimes it is necessary to specify that the processed image has a desired histogram shape. This method for generating a shape with a special histogram after processing is called histogram specification. A histogram specification adjusts the histogram of the original image according to a predetermined shape to transform the histogram shape to a specific shape. The histogram specification transforms the histogram of the original image into a prescribed shape by establishing a relationship of mapping of pixels between the original image and the desired image. There are following steps for implementing a histogram specification.:
1) Equalizing the original image; 2) Performing equalization on the histogram of the target image. Calculating a transformation that can equalize the specified histogram;
3) Invert the transformation obtained in the first step and map the original histogram onto the prescribed histogram.
It is set that r, z, u, v as random variables. P r (r) and P z (z) represent the gray probability density function of the original image and the target image. For continuous images, the original image and the target image can be equalized using (17) and (18) .
The probability density P r (r) and P z (z) of the original image and the target image after equalization are uniformly VOLUME 7, 2019 distributed. Using (19) and (20) , the uniform grayscale u is obtained from the original image to replace the v in the inverse transform.
For discrete images, they can be specified using (21) , (22) and (22):
The specific operation of the histogram specification is to select the appropriate mapping rule and map the gray value of the original histogram to the target histogram. Rounding errors may occur during the mapping process. Thus it is necessary to choose the appropriate mapping algorithm. This paper introduces two common histogram specification methods:
1) SINGLE MAPPING LAW (SML)
Find the k and l that can minimize the value of (24) from small to large.
Then P r (r i ) is assigned to P z z j . Since each P r (r i ) is obtained separately. Although this method is simple and intuitive, sometimes there is a large rounding error.
2) GROUP MAPPING LAW (GML)
Suppose there is an integer function I (l) , l = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N − 1 that satisfies (25):
Determine the I (l) that can achieve the minimum of (26),
If l= 0, correspond P r (r i ) which i is from 0 to I (0) to P z (z 0 ); if l ≥ 1,correspond P r (r i ) whose i is from I (l − 1)+1 to I (l) to P z z j .
From the perspective of algorithm implementation, the SML mapping rule is a biased mapping rule. In other words, some range of gray levels will be biased mapped to a gray level close to the starting calculation. The GML mapping specification is statistically unbiased, can fundamentally avoid the above problems. So the GML mapping rules will always get closer to the specified histogram than the SML mapping rules.
There are also other histogram specification methods such as interval mapping law (IML), the gradually adjacent group mapping law (GAGML), and the precise histogram specification. Since this paper does not cover specific image processing field, it will not be described in detail. 
B. METHODS OF INTERVAL HISTOGRAM NORMALIZATION
In the flow of the specification of the grayscale image histogram, firstly it needs to equalize the histogram of the original image and the target image. Then match according to SML or GML mapping rules. However, for the time distribution of data packets in network flow intervals, Wang et al. [13] have shown that when there are enough data packets in the interval, the distribution of data packet time is substantially uniform. This means that the original histogram of the packet time in the interval is already in an equalized state. Therefore, the target histogram can be equalized in advance. The mapping function between the original histogram of the interval and the target histogram is preserved. After each packet arriving, the real-time normalization operation can be performed. This operation is according to the offset of the packet relative to the start of the interval and the mapping function without waiting for the entire interval to be buffered. This avoids the time and space overhead caused by repeatedly calculating the mapping function.
The interval histogram specification operation proposed in the paper can be divided into three processes. First, select the appropriate target histogram according to the modulation amplitude. Secondly, the mapping function between the original histogram of the interval and the target histogram is calculated. Finally, according to the mapping function, the received data packet is subjected to real-time regularization operation.
1) GET THE TARGET HISTOGRAM
Choosing the appropriate f (x) is the focus and difficulty of the interval histogram specification method. To compare with the ICBW, the paper keeps the interval centroid modulation amplitude and interval length at an order of magnitude. f (x) is represented by a linear function, f (x) = kx + b. As shown in Figure 7 ,. Figure 7 a) represents the original histogram of a interval in the network flow. Figure 7 b) represents the desired target histogram. When the modulation amplitude is α, f (x) needs to satisfy (27) and (28) . The number of packets in the interval is unchanged. The centroid of the interval is
When there are enough data packets in the interval, it is used as a continuous interval to solve the above equations: 
3) REAL-TIME SPECIFICATION OF RECEIVED DATA PACKETS ACCORDING TO THE MAPPING FUNCTION
After obtaining the hisMap mapping relationship between the original histogram of the interval and the target histogram, the received data packet is real-time regulated according to the mapping function. When a new data packet arrives in the interval, after calculating the interval i from the data packet, the data packet time in the interval is mapped to the period corresponding to t i by (32) to obtain a new data packet time.
The operation continues until the mapping of all packet times is completed. In order to verify the actual effect of the interval histogram specification, the paper intercepts a interval of 1000ms from an SSH network flow. This method records the original interval and the interval data packet distribution after the watermark is modulated by the ICBW and HSICBW methods. The modulation amplitude is 150ms. Figure 8 shows the packet distribution of the original network flow intervals with no watermark embedded. It can be seen that the packets are discretely distributed throughout the interval. Figure 9 shows the histogram packet distribution histogram embedded in the ICBW watermark. It can be seen from the figure that there is an apparent empty period of 150ms. Figure 10 shows the histogram distribution of the time-interval packet embedded in the HSICBW watermark. No obvious empty period is found in the figure, which is consistent with expectations.
C. PRINCIPLES OF HSICBW
The paper describes HSICBW as a 5-tuple <OF,W,EM, DM,CM,AP>, where OF = {f 1 , f 2 , . . . ,f k represents a set of original network flows through the watermarking device. W = {w 1 , w 2 , . . . ,w l } , l > 0 is the original watermark, w i = {−1, 1} represents a watermark. EM is a watermark embedding function that embeds the specified watermark W into the original flow f i with the given parameters. DM is a watermark extracting function that recovers watermarks according to the parameters from the network flow which modulates watermarks. AP is the watermark embedding and extracting parameters. AP = {PN, S, T, α, r, o}. PN represents a set of pseudo noise code sequences. S stands for random distribution strategy. T and o represent the interval length and the network flow starting offset respectively. α represents the modulation amplitude. r stands for redundancy value to increase resistance to network interference.
In HSICBW scheme, it embeds the original watermark of l bits. According to the given parameters T and o, 2lnr intervals are obtained from the network flow f w to be embedded beginning with the starting offset. Length of the interval is T. The intervals are denoted as I 0 , I 1 , . . ., I n−1 . The interval group is randomly divided into A and B two large groups by the random distribution strategy S, where |A| = |B| = lnr. According to the length l of the watermark W, A and B are randomly divided into l symbol groups for corresponding one watermark. This is recorded as A = {A 1 , A 2 , . . . ,A l }, B = {B 1 , B 2 , . . . ,B l }, where |A i | = |B i | = nr. Then, A i and B i are equally divided into n groups according to the length n of the pseudo noise code. Each group contains r intervals, which are recorded as A i = {A i,1 , A i,2 , . . . ,A i,n } and B i = {B i,1 , B i,2 , . . . ,B i,n }. A i,j , B i,j are used to embed the j-th symbol of the i-th bit of the watermark after the spread spectrum. The combined centroids C(A i,j ) and C(B i,j ) of A i,j , B i,j are calculated uses (33) and (34) , where I A i,j,k , I B i,j,k represent the k-th interval of the r intervals in A i,j , B i,j respectively. N A i,j,k and N B i,j,k represent the number of data packets in the intervals I A i,j,k and I B i,j,k respectively.
The watermark is embedded by adjusting the size of Y i,j . The interval target histogram function f (x) is calculated using (31) for the specified interval length T and modulation amplitude α. The GML mapping rule is used to find the I (l) that can achieve the minimum of (26) . Thenthe mapping rule hisMap of the interval original histogram to the target histogram can be obtained.
When the embedded watermark is 1, for each interval of r intervals in A i,j , the specification operation of the data packets in the interval is performed by hisMap and (33) . No processing is performed on B i,j , so that the combined interval centroid difference Y i,j is increased by a/2.
When the embedded watermark is −1, the specification operation of the data packets in the interval is performed for each interval of the r intervals in B i,j . No processing is performed on A i,j , so that Y i,j is decreased by a/2.
For the detector, the same parameters can be used to intercept 2lnr intervals for the network flow. Then, group them according to the same random strategy S. Finally, Y i,j is calculated to decode the j-th bit symbol signal of the i-th watermark. If Y i,j > 0, the corresponding symbol signal is 1. If Y i,j < 0, the corresponding symbol signal is −1.
D. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HSICBW
According to the principle of HSICBW, in the process of watermark embedding, whether the interval in the network flow needs to adjust the centroid depends on the random distribution strategy S, the original watermark information and the PN code. Therefore, the HSICBW method first generates a mapping table of network flow interval numbers in watermark embedding. This is according to a specified random distribution strategy S, original watermark information and PN code. Then, the watermark is embedded in the cached interval in real time according to the mapping table. It is not necessary to wait for all intervals to be buffered before starting the watermark embedding work.
In the HSICBW scheme, the process of the watermark embedding of the embedder is shown in figure 11 . The specific embedding steps are as follows: 1) An original watermark W of length L is generated and spread according to a PN code of a given length n to obtain a watermark symbol SW with a length of ln after spreading.
2) A one-dimensional array I = {I 0 , I 1 , . . . ., I 2lnr−1 } of a specified length of 2lnr is generated. I i represents the value of the watermark to be embedded in the interval of sequence number i in the network flow. Initialize each element in array I to zero.
3) The spread watermark symbol SW is assigned to the corresponding element in the array I according to the random distribution strategy S. Then the watermark value to be embedded in the interval of the specified sequence number can be obtained. At this time, the array I can be used as a mapping table of interval numbers and watermark symbols.
4) The network flow is buffered according to the interval length T and the starting offset O. For each interval being cached, generate the mapping table (the array I )according to step three. The watermark I i to be embedded in the specified interval number i is obtained. If I i is 1, the histogram is normalized to the interval use (30) . The centroid is increased. If I i is −1, no action need to be taken. After all 2lnr intervals have been processed, the embedding of the watermark is completed. The flow chart of the watermark decoding by the detector is shown in figure 12 . The specific detection steps are as follows:
5) A one-dimensional array C = {C 0 , C 1 , . . . ., C 2lnr−1 } of a specified length of 2lnr is generated. Here C i is used to store the interval centroid of the i-th interval.
6) The network flow is buffered according to the interval length T and the start offset O. Each time a interval is buffered, caculate its centroid and fill it into the array C until 2lnr intervals are processed. 7) According to the same random distribution strategy S, the array C is divided into ln symbols in two large groups, A and B. Each symbol includes r intervals. 8) Calculating the value of each watermark symbol to obtain a restored watermark symbol sequence. Then, performing a despreading operation on the restored watermark symbol sequence to obtain a recovered watermark sequence. 9) Calculating the similarity between the original watermark and the recovered watermark. Judging the relevance of the network flow.
VI. METHODS FOR PARALLEL TRACKING OF MULTIPLE ATTACK FLOWS BASED ON HSICBW
In the process of implementing intrusion tracking according to network flow watermarking technology, multiple network flows often pass through the embedder and the detector in the same period. Since the intrusion tracking does not know which network flow is the attack flow of the intruder, the embedder and the detector need to process each flow in parallel to complete the watermark embedding and extracting. The embedder selects a plurality of differentiated original watermarks. It embeds watermarks in parallel to multiple network flows passing through the device. Then the embedder adds the watermark embedding information to the tracking database. For the detector, each passed network flow needs to be detected. The network flow association is completed by comparing the restored watermark with the watermark in the tracking database.
The paper combines the spread spectrum technology with the HSICBW. Here proposes a watermarking scheme for parallel tracking of multiple attack flows. When performing tracking, different PN codes are selected for each network flow to spread the original watermark. The difference between the watermarks of different network flows is obviously increased. The invisible watermark is embedded according to the HSICBW method.
A. PROCESS OF MULTIPLE ATTACKFLOW PARALLEL WATERMARK EMBEDDING OF = {f 1 , f 2 , . . . ,f k } represents multiple original network flows through the watermark embedding end. f i represents the first network flow. The multi-attack flow parallel watermark embedding process is as follows:
1) k original watermark groups for length l are generated and are denoted by W = {W 1 , W 2 , . . . , W k } |W i | = l. W i is used to embed the i-th network flow. It is necessary to have enough Hamming code distances h between every two original watermarks W i , W j in the watermark group W for distinguishing from each other.
2) Generate k closely orthogonal pseudo noise codes PN = 1) The watermark extracting is performed on the f i with the same parameters T and o, l, n, r. The interval centroid values for successive 2lnr intervals are calculated and stored in array C.
2) Calculate the interval centroid of consecutive 2lnr intervals in f i . Then caculate the watermark symbol according to the same random distribution strategy S and array C, as the embedder.
3) Select a group of W i and PN i as parameters from the intrusion tracking library. Perform despreading according to the selected PN i code. Then obtain the recovered watermark W i . 4) Comparing the similarity between W i and W i . If the similarity exceeds the given threshold, the watermark extracting of the network flow f i is completed. If the similarity is lower than the threshold, the next set of W i and PN i is selected from the intrusion tracking database as a parameter. Then go back to step 3) until a set of parameters exceeding the threshold is found or all parameters are tried.
Write the tracking result into the intrusion tracking result database.
VII. EXPERIMENT A. EXPERIMENTAL ENVIRONMENT
This article builds the experimental environment shown in Figure 13 . A total of five edge computing nodes are used, which are connected to each other using a local area network. The edge computing node located at the sender of the watermark replays the real SSH communication packet and sends it to the embedder. The edge computing node located at the embedder delays the data packet to be embedded in the watermark according to the specified watermark embedding method. Then the node sends the data packet to the jammer. It modulates the original watermark W into the target network flow in real time. After the watermark has been embedded, the features of the network flow are added to the tracking database along with the original watermark. The jammer is responsible for adding a specified Gaussian jitter to the passing network flow packets to simulate interference from network communications. The detector records the arrival time of the data packet after receiving the network flow. The record is used for detecting the watermark. Simultaneously, it sends the data packet to the edge computing node at the receiver. When the watermark is detected, the detector compares the detected watermark W with the original watermark in the tracking database. This is to realize network flow associationand complete the intrusion tracking.
All SSH packets in the experiment are from the actual SSH communication packet. The experiment selected 200 SSH network flows as experimental data from the data set captured by the Center for Applied Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA) [31] . On average, each flow contains 8000 packets. In the experiment, the Hamming code distance is used as a threshold for detecting the similarity between the original watermark of the embedder and the watermark recovered by the reader. 
B. DETECTION ACCURACY OF HSICBW TRACKING
The paper firstly examines the effects of various parameters of the HSICBW method on tracking accuracy. The experiment selects the original watermark with a length of 32 bits. When the difference between the original watermark and the recovered watermark is less than the specified Hamming code distance threshold, it is determined that the tracking is successful. The experiment examines the influence of the parameters ( interval length T, modulation amplitude a, pseudo noise code length n, redundancy value r ) on the tracking accuracy in HSICBW.
1) EFFECT OF INTERVAL LENGTH ON DETECTION ACCURACY
The interval length T directly affects the number of packets in the interval. The packets in the interval increase as the interval length increases. It can be obtained from theoretical analysis that the accuracy rate should increase as the length of the interval increases. The parameters set by the experiment are as follows: the modulation amplitude is set to 150ms. The PN code length is set to 4. The redundancy value is set to 4. The added jitter range is set to 200ms. The range of the interval length is set to gradually increase from 300ms to 1250ms, increasing by 50ms each time. The experiment records the tracking accuracy of various thresholds of Hamming code distance HD from 2 to 7. As shown in Figure 14 , the tracking accuracy increases with the increase of the interval length when other parameters are unchanged. This is consistent with the theoretical analysis. When the interval length is 850ms and the Hamming code distance is HD=3, the tracking accuracy rate converges to 100%, which is the highest.
2) EFFECT OF MODULATION AMPLITUDE ON DETECTION ACCURACY
The modulation amplitude directly determines the difference between the original network flow and the modulated network flow. It can be obtained from theoretical analysis that the detection rate should increase as the modulation amplitude increases. The parameters set by the experiment are as follows. The length of the network interval is set to 1000 ms. The length of the PN code is set to 4. The redundancy value is set to 4. The random jitter of the network is set to 200 ms. The modulation amplitude is set from 50ms to 300ms, increasing by 25ms each time. The experiment records the tracking accuracy of various thresholds of Hamming code distance HD from 2 to 7. As shown in Figure 15 , when other parameters are unchanged, the tracking accuracy increases as the modulation amplitude increases. This is consistent with the theoretical analysis. When the interval length is 150ms and the Hamming code distance is HD=3, the tracking accuracy basically converges to 100%.
3) EFFECT OF LENGTH OF PSEUDO-NOISE CODE ON DETECTION ACCURACY
The pseudo-noise code length directly determines the resistance to network interference in the network carrying the watermark. It can be obtained from theoretical analysis that the detection rate should increase as the pseudo noise code length increases. The parameters set by the experiment are as follows. The length of the selected network interval is set to 1000 ms. The modulation amplitude is set to 150 ms. The redundancy value is set to 4. The network random jitter is set to 200 ms. The pseudo noise code length is set from 1 to 11, increasing by 1 each time. The experiment records the tracking accuracy of various thresholds of Hamming code distance HD from 2 to 7. As shown in Figure 16 , the tracking accuracy increases as the other parameters are unchanged, as the length of the PN code increases, which is consistent with the theoretical analysis. When the PN code length is 5 and the Hamming code distance is HD=3, the tracking accuracy basically converges to 100%, which is the highest.
4) EFFECT OF REDUNDANCY VALUE ON DETECTION ACCURACY
The redundancy value determines the number of intervals embedded in the same watermark. When the redundancy value is larger, the detected watermark is less affected by network interference. It can be obtained from theoretical analysis that the detection rate should increase as the redundancy value increases. The parameters set by the experiment are as follows. The length of the selected network interval is set to 1000 ms. The modulation amplitude is set to 150 ms. The PN code length is set to 4. The network random jitter is set to 200 ms. The redundancy is set from 1 to 9, increasing by 1 each time. The experiment records the tracking accuracy of various thresholds of Hamming code distance HD from 2 to 7. As shown in Figure 17 , the tracking accuracy increases with the increase of the redundancy value when other parameters are unchanged. This is consistent with the theoretical analysis. When the redundancy value is 4 and the Hamming code distance is HD=3, the tracking accuracy basically converges to 100%, which is the highest.
C. COMPARISON OF TRACKING ACCURACY AND TIME OVERHEAD BETWEEN HSICBW AND ICBW
In order to detect the difference between the accuracy of the intrusion tracking of HSICBW and ICBW, the parameters are as follows: the selected interval length is set to 1000 ms. The modulation amplitude is set to 150 ms. The length of the PN code is set to 4. The redundancy value is set to 4. The range of random jitter is set added by the jammer from 25ms to 475ms, increasing by 25ms each time. The tracking accuracy of the HSICBW and ICBW schemes is calculated separately when the Hamming code distance is 2 to 4 as the threshold. Figure 18 represents the tracking accuracy of HSICBW and ICBW watermarks under network jitter of a specified amplitude for thresholds of 2, 3, and 4. In the case where the parameters and network jitter are consistent, the tracking accuracy of the HSICBW is slightly higher than the ICBW. The paper also analyzes the time overhead of HSICBW method in watermark embedding. The parameters in the experiment are as follows. The modulation amplitude is set to 150ms. The length of the PN code is set to 4. The redundancy value is set to 4.The range of the interval length is set from 800ms to 1700ms, increasing by 100ms each time. The time required for the HSICBW, ICBW to embed the watermark and the time it takes to complete the entire watermark embedding process are recorded separately. As shown in Figure 19 , the HSICBW method has a slightly higher watermark embedding time than the ICBW method. Figure 20 shows the duration of the HSICBW and ICBW to complete the watermark embedding taking into account the interval data buffering time. It can be seen from the figure that the time required by the HSICBW method and the ICBW method to complete the entire watermark embedding process is basically the same. The process does not bring additional time overhead to the watermarking scheme. The method is feasible.
D. TEST OF RESISTANCE OF HSICBW TO MULTI-FLOW ATTACKS
This paper proposes that HSICBW aims to defend against multi-flow attacks. In order to verify the resistance of HSICBW to multi-flow attacks, the paper carried out the following comparative experiments. The resistance of HSICBW, multi-random function ICBW, multi-PN code spread spectrum ICBW to multi-flow attacks after embedding watermarks is verified separately. The experimental parameters are set as follows: the interval length is set to 1000 ms; the watermark modulation amplitude is set to 150 ms; the observation interval length selected by the edge computing multi-flow attacks is set to 100 ms. 10 network flows are observed at the same time. Figures 21, 22 , 23 and 24 respectively represent histograms obtained after multi-flow attacks observation of network flow without embedded watermark, network flow embedded with ICBW watermark, network flow embedded with ICBW watermark with different random strategy S and network flow embedded with HSICBW watermark. As can be seen from Figure 22 , under multi-flow attacks observation, in network flows embedded with ICBW watermark, there are multiple empty periods. No data packets arrive in these empty periods. Thus, it can be considered that the interval watermark is embedded.
As shown in Figure 23 , under multi-flow attacks observation, in network flows embedded with ICBW watermark with different random strategy S, there is no empty period. So the attacker cannot determine that there is a watermark in the network flow.
As shown in Figure 23 , the network flows embedded with HSICBW watermark is similar to the network flows embedded with ICBW watermark with different random strategy S, there is no empty period. So it can resist the threat of multiflow attacks.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a histogram specified interval centroid-based watermarking technique(HSICBW). It realizes invisible watermark embedding by implementing histogram specification on the packet time in the network flow interval. Based on the invisibility of the current mainstream interval centroid based watermarking schemes, this work combine the principle and implementation flow of edge computing multi-flow attacks. In the module, a histogram specified interval centroid-based watermarking method is proposed. Then, a multiple flows parallel tracking scheme based on HSICBW is given. Finally, experiments were carried out to verify the tracking accuracy of HSICBW and the ability to resist edge computing multi-flow attacks. In the case of the same parameters, the detection accuracy of the HSICBW scheme is slightly higher than the ICBW scheme. The HSICBW does not bring additional time and space overhead. Compared with ICBW, HSICBW has better privacy and can resist multi-flow attacks. Compared with other edge computing multi-flow attacks resistance method, the implementation process of HSICBW is simpler. This can effectively reduce the time and space overhead of parallel tracking of multiple attack flows. However, in order to deal with the rapid development of network technology and complex security situation, network watermarking technology still need further research. Next step, network water marking technology needs to be more stable, secretive and anti-jamming. This will improve the intra-domain tracking capability of the crossdomain collaborative tracking framework. Moreover, how to further improve the secrecy and robustness of watermark is an urgent problem to be solved. In addition, for different network environment and different characteristics of the network flow, to improve environmental adaptability of the network watermarking technology will also promote the practicability of network water marking effectively. These problems will be considered to be improved in the future. JUN SAINAN ZHANG is currently pursuing the master's degree with the Nanjing University of Science and Technology, China. Her main research direction includes industrial control network security. VOLUME 7, 2019 
